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Abstract	
What	is	the	causal	relationship	between	crisis,	learning	and	change?	How	does	causality	works	in	the	
current	 responses	 to	 the	 sovereign	debt	 crisis	 provided	by	 the	European	Union?	We	question	 the	
conventional	 identification	 of	 the	 cause-and-effect	 relationship	 provided	 by	 theories	 of	 crisis	
management,	integration	and	policy	learning.	Drawing	on	models	of	contingent	learning	developed	
within	psychology	and	behavioural	and	evolutionary	economics,	we	theorise	that	surprise	produces	
behavioural	 change	 via	 a	 fast-paced	 associative	 cue-outcome	mechanism	 and	 that	 policy	 learning	
follows	change.	We	 then	 run	our	exercise	 in	 causal	 identification	 through	a	plausibility	probe.	We	
show	that	our	argument	passes	the	plausibility	probe.	Our	conclusions	on	cognition	and	situational	
effects	on	learning	suggest	a	new	research	agenda,	more	sensitive	to	how	individuals	behave	in	the	
real	world	and	more	robust	in	its	micro-foundations.	
Key	words		
CONTINGENT	LEARNING;	CRISIS;	MECHANISMS;	POLICY	CHANGE;	POLICY	LEARNING	
	
Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. 
Milton Friedman	
	
1. Motivation,	topic	and	arguments	
What	is	the	relationship	between	crisis,	learning	and	change?	In	the	history	of	European	
integration,	the	presence	of	a	major	crisis	has	often	been	the	necessary	condition	for	non-
incremental	change	(Schmitter	1970).	The	crisis	of	the	Eurozone	and	the	responses	
produced	by	the	institutions	of	the	European	Union	(EU)	make	this	question	central	both	for	
researchers	and	policy	makers.	Let	us	briefly	unpack	this	complex	relationship	between	
crisis,	learning	and	change	starting	from	the	first	two	elements	–	crisis	and	learning.		
In	general	terms,	crisis	conditions	are	thought	to	have	the	potential	to	accelerate	policy	
learning	(Stern	1997:	73;	Deverell	2009:	180-181;	Birkland	2004).		But	there	are	crisis-
specific	conditions	for	change	and	types	of	crisis	that	facilitate	or	hinder	learning	(Smith	and	
Elliot	2007).	Different	conditions	of	crisis	development	and	termination,	for	instance,	define	
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its	progression	through	time	(fast	or	slow-burning,	cathartic	or	long	shadow)	and	hence	
affect	the	likelihood	of	learning	(‘t	Hart	and	Boin	2001).	An	important	theme	in	this	
literature	is	the	difference	between	learning	across	crises	and	learning	within	a	crisis.	Intra-
crisis	situations	are	constrained	by	time	pressure:	within	a	crisis,	there	is	not	enough	time	to	
learn	the	right	lessons.	The	upheavals	of	the	Eurozone	since	2009	fall	in	the	category	of	
intra-crisis	rather	than	inter-crisis	management	(Deverell	2009).		
Turning	to	the	second	component	of	the	causal	relationship	-	from	learning	to	change	-	
theories	of	learning	in	public	policy	(May	1992;	Bennett	and	Howlett	1992;	recently	
Biegelbauer	2015)	have	long	discussed	the	determinants	and	levels	of	policy	change	(Hall	
1993).	Although	the	exact	nature	of	the	causal	relationship	between	learning	and	change	is	
still	debated,	the	combination	of	integration	theory	and	theories	of	learning	in	public	policy	
shows	a	possible	pathway	between	crisis,	learning	and	change.	And	the	pathway	follows	a	
sequence	that	goes	from	the	crisis	as	trigger	for	learning,	provided	that	some	scope	
conditions	are	met	(Lefkofridi	and	Schmitter	2014),	to	policy	learning	as	causal	determinant	
of	non-incremental	change.	As	we	shall	explain	below,	if	we	combine	the	two	segments	of	
the	causal	relationship	and	address	the	scope	conditions,	we	should	conclude	that	change	is	
hardly	predictable	in	the	Eurozone	crisis.	Nonetheless,	this	crisis	has	indubitably	led	to	non-
incremental	change	in	the	form	of	‘more	integration’,	at	least	in	the	main	domains	of	
Economic	and	Monetary	Union	(EMU)	(Ioannou	et	al.	2015).	This	motivates	a	new	reflection	
on	the	causal	mechanisms	between	crisis	and	learning,	and	between	learning	and	change.		
In	this	article	we	perform	an	exercise	in	causal	identification:	we	put	forth	a	novel	approach	
to	the	cause-and-effect	mechanisms	in	processes	of	crisis	management,	learning	and	
change.	We	argue	that	crises	can	produce	sudden	change	via	fast-paced	processes	of	cue-
outcome	associations;	that	change	in	turn	triggers	policy	learning	-	thus	reversing	the	causal	
mechanism;	and	finally,	that	feedback	reinforces	the	mechanisms	of	learning	and	locks-in	
change.	To	achieve	that,	we	draw	on	strands	of	economics	and	psychology	that	are	based	
on	how	individuals	behave.	This	gives	us	strong	micro-foundations.	In	particular	we	build	on	
contingent	learning	and	human	contingency	learning	(HCL).	We	theorise	learning	and	
change	on	the	basis	of	what	we	know	about	behaviour	–	the	theories	we	draw	upon	are	
behaviour-oriented.	Indeed,	to	add	flesh	to	the	bones	of	our	approach	to	learning,	we	
perform	a	plausibility	probe,	showing	how	our	argument	broadly	matches	evidence	on	the	
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Eurozone	crisis.	In	particular,	we	draw	attention	to	three	dimensions:	low-cognition	
associative	responses,	contingency,	and	feedback.	We	then	relate	these	dimensions	and	
more	broadly	our	findings	to	integration	theories,	showing	that	a	critical	conversation	is	
possible	and	fruitful.		
A	caveat:	the	mechanism	we	described	is	called	contingent	learning,	which	is	a	fast,	
surprise-triggered	understanding	of	how	cue-outcome	associations	work.	Contingent	
learning	is	not	based	on	drawing	inferences	from	experience	and	does	not	involve	any	
change	of	priors.	Surprise	trumps	priors.	Thus,	contingent	learning	is	not	policy	learning	–	
the	type	of	learning	discussed	by	political	scientists	–	no	matter	what	type	of	policy	learning	
we	consider	(Bennet	and	Howlett,	1992).	Contingent	learning	is	also	different	from	
‘adaptive	learning’	in	political	science	(Levy	1994;	May	1992:	336-337),	where	we	talk	about	
minimal	policy	re-design	in	response	to	contextual	variations..	May	(1992)	even	doubts	that	
re-design	is	a	manifestation	of	learning.	To	paraphrase	Checkel	(1998:	546),	in	the	adaptive	
mode,	actors	run	into	a	new	context,	‘go	“ouch”,	and	then	recalculate	how,	in	the	pressure	
of	the	structure,	to	achieve	their	interests’.	
The	approach	we	offer	goes	much	further	than	policy	adaptation.	We	argue	that	in	episodes	
of	intra-crisis	management	characterized	by	‘stress,	uncertainty,	time	pressure	and	
demands	for	rapid	action’	(Deverell	2009:	182)	real-time	change	takes	place	through	
associative	processes	of	contingent	learning	and	that	the	nature	of	this	behavioural	change	
is	larger	than	re-design.	Change	can	be	greater	than	incremental	adaptations.		In	change-or-
die	situations	we	find	accidental	(policy)	heroes.	They	produce	significant	change	and	only	
later	they	reflect	on	‘what	have	we	done’	and	start	drawing	inferences	from	experience,	
thus	entering	the	world	of	policy	learning	as	defined	by	political	scientists.	Thanks	to	the	
explicit	conceptualization	of	the	mechanism	of	contingent	learning	we	also	go	beyond	the	
crisis	management	literature	that	refers	to	such	phenomena	as	mere	‘improvisation’	
(Deverell	2009:	181;	Birkland	2009:	154)	or	‘do	something’	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	a	
critical	focusing	event	(Birkland	2004:	342).	We	further	argue	that	conventional	policy	
learning	does	not	disappear,	but	that	it	occurs	in	the	post-decisional	phase	as	feedback	that	
anchors	change.		
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In	the	remainder	of	the	article	we	proceed	by	first	reasoning	on	the	nature	of	the	Euro	crisis.	
Then,	we	specify	our	explanatory	framework	by	identifying	causality	between	crisis,	change	
and	learning.	This	leads	us	to	perform	a	plausibility	probe.	Finally,	as	mentioned,	we	relate	
our	findings	to	theories	of	policy	learning,	making	suggestions	for	further	research.		
	
2. A	‘bad’	crisis	for	the	EU?	
The	debate	on	the	nature	of	the	Eurozone	crisis	is	still	open,	especially	among	integration	
theorists	(Tosun	et	al.	2014;	Ioannou	et	al.	2015).	For	Lefkofridi	and	Schmitter	(2014)	this	
phase	of	integration	is	not	a	‘good’	cathartic	crisis.	Indeed,	they	observe	the	reverse	of	the	
scope	conditions	for	the	cathartic	crisis	to	occur.	An	important	Jepp	2015	special	issue	
qualifies	this	observation	by	arguing	that	although	there	has	not	been	a	federal	‘cathartic’	
leap,	the	EU	has	been	able	to	respond	with	a	number	of	governance	innovations,	at	least	in	
the	domains	of	economic	governance	and	EMU.	In	this	section	we	consider	the	literature	on	
integration	and	the	study	of	crisis	management.	
With	regard	to	the	former,	Lefkofridi	and	Schmitter	(2014)	shed	light	on	causal	variables	
that	have	hindered	learning:	(a)	The	crisis	trigger	was	exogenous	and	most	of	the	responses	
to	this	shock	were	completely	outside	the	control	of	EU	policy-makers;	(b)	The	impact	of	the	
crisis	has	been	uneven,	with	cumulative	effects	in	terms	of	North-South	cleavages	that	have	
hindered	mutuality	and	solidarity	among	the	Member	States.	If	cleavages	have	cumulative	
effects,	solidarity	and	trust	are	unlikely	to	lift	the	EU	off	its	collective	action	problems;	(c)	
Absence	of	epistemic	communities	operating	under	conditions	of	low	politicization;	(d)	Lack	
of	visionary	leaders	or	a	set	of	well-identifiable,	entrepreneurial	institutions	that	point	
clearly	to	the	finalité	politique	–	such	as	the	‘federal’	or	federalising	EU.	On	the	institutional	
side,	there	is	not	much	to	expect	in	terms	of	well-identifiable	entrepreneurship/leadership	
and	focal	points	for	the	causal	effects	of	ideas	to	occur	(Garrett	and	Weingast	1993;	
Niemann	and	Ioannou	2015).	EU	decision-making	is	characterised	by	poly-centrism	(e.g.,	
Economic	and	Finance	Committee;	Eurogroup,	European	Central	Bank,	the	President	of	the	
Commission;	the	German	Chancellor)	without	a	clear	constitutional	mandate.	This	leads	to	a	
‘strongly	fragmented	governance	structure’	(Van	Esch	and	Swinkels	2015:	1204)	that	affects	
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negatively	sense-making	during	crises,	the	compatibility	of	beliefs,	and	the	presence	and	
effectiveness	of	leadership.	
Among	the	decision-makers,	the	most	visible	(yet	weak)	sign	of	vision	is	the	necessity	to	
rescue	the	Euro	‘whatever	it	takes’	(Rehn	2010;	Draghi	2012).	For	the	European	Commission	
and	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB),	but	also	for	Germany,	this	position	goes	hand	in	hand	
with	the	protection	of	the	European	project.	In	fact,	a	failure	of	monetary	integration	would	
undermine	the	whole	EU’s	construction,	possibly	leading	to	full-blown	disintegration.	Most	
of	the	recent	innovations	in	fiscal	monitoring/surveillance	and	structural	reforms	derive	
from	this	commitment	(Schimmelfennig	2015),	as	well	as	it	does	the	critical	decision	to	
renege	on	the	no	bail-out	clause	of	EMU	in	2010	and	to	implement	first	ad-hoc	rescue	
packages	for	financially	distressed	Eurozone	members	and	then	to	establish	a	permanent	
stability	fund.		These	innovations	took	place,	paradoxically,	without	an	explicit	quantum	
leap,	not	only	in	the	ideational	and	discursive	dimension	of	decision	makers,	but	also	in	their	
sense	of	uncertainty,	threat	and	urgency	(Van	Esch	2015;	Van	Esch	and	Swinkels	2015).1	The	
political	debate	on	the	necessity	of	a	resilient	Euro	and	further	integration	has	led	Merkel	
and	Hollande	and	different	EU	leaders	to	talk	about	constitutional	federalism	in	allusive,	
almost	reluctant	ways	(Borriello	and	Crespy	2015:	515).		In	short,	key	decision	makers	within	
the	EU	polity	were	not	able	or	willing	to	articulate	a	vision	and	ideational	paradigm	to	
support	non-incremental	change;	yet,	the	latter	took	place	(Ioannou	et	al.	2015)	within	a	
relatively	short	timeframe	in	the	first	months	of	2010.	
Along	with	these	EU-specific	stumbling	features,	further	hindrances	to	crisis-driven	policy	
learning	and	change	are	posed	by	the	very	nature	of	the	Eurozone	crisis.	Here	we	need	the	
literature	on	crisis	management.	As	mentioned,	there	is	a	crucial	difference	between	inter-
crisis	management	and	intra-crisis	decisions	in	terms	of	policy	learning	(Birkland	2009;	
Deverell	2009).	Inter-crisis	management	allows	time	to	learn	lessons	between	a	crisis	and	
the	next	–	although	this	does	not	mean	that	learning	processes	are	necessarily	smooth	
(Birkland	2004;	Boin	et	al.	2009;	Nohrstedt	2009;	Stern	1997).	Intra-crisis	management	
																																								 																				
1	During	the	first	six	months	of	the	crisis	(November	2009	to	May	2010)	Van	Esch	and	Swinkels	(2015:	1220)	
argue	that,	‘rather	than	delving	into	the	roots	of	the	crisis,	leaders	predominantly	discussed	possible	
resolutions	and	the	role	they	and	others	must	play	in	them’.		
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occurs	when	a	specific	crisis	is	still	on	going.	It	focuses	on	halting	the	effects	of	a	crisis	
(Moynhian	2009),	when	there	is	little	precious	time	for	sense-making.		
The	crisis	management	literature	also	helps	us	to	identify	the	Eurozone	crisis	as	long-
shadow,	that	is,	a	crisis	characterized	by	fast	speed	of	development	and	by	gradual	speed	of	
termination	(‘t	Hart	and	Boin	2001).	We	often	hear	that	the	crisis	provides	a	window	of	
opportunity	for	change	(see	the	sophisticated	version	of	the	argument	in	Birkland	2004).	But	
the	appearance	of	learning	strongly	depends	on	the	temporal,	cognitive	and	substantive	
constraints	that	the	crisis	itself	poses.	And	these	constrains	are	magnified	in	case	of	intra-
crisis	management	of	a	long-shadow	series	of	critical	events.	In	these	instances,	as	
Moynhian	(2009:	191)	puts	it,	decision	makers	‘must	engage	in	sense-making	under	limited	
time,	dynamic	conditions,	and	intense	pressure,	evaluating	the	nature	and	scope	of	a	crisis	
and	searching	for	an	appropriate	response	[…]	They	cannot	make	vague	recommendations	
of	policy	suggestions	for	a	distant	future,	but	must	implement	whatever	changes	they	can	
immediately’.		
To	wrap	things	up	then,	the	puzzle	that	motivates	our	project	is	what	kind	of	learning	
mechanism	may	have	been	at	work	under	these	conditions	where	we	would	not	normally	
expect	learning	and	substantial	policy	change	to	occur.	
	
3. Theorising	(and	reversing)	the	relationship	between	policy	learning	and	change	
To	sum	up	our	previous	arguments,	the	EU	faces	an	exogenous	crisis	without	the	
institutional,	entrepreneurial	and	epistemic	leadership	that	in	the	past	proved	indispensable	
to	generate	quantum	leaps.	The	EU	actors’	constellation	is	still	characterized	by	multiple	
veto	points	and	players	and	by	fragmented	governance,	increasing	the	distributive	costs	of	
policy	change.	Then,	the	long	shadow	crises	and	their	intra-crisis	management	pose	a	
serious	time-constraint	to	lesson-drawing.	
This	interpretation	arises	from	a	classic	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	policy	
learning	and	policy	change	in	political	science.	To	achieve	change,	actors	must	learn	in	the	
first	place,	that	is,	they	have	first	to	acquire,	accumulate,	process	and	exchange	knowledge	
and	then	behaviour	accordingly.	One	way	or	the	other,	they	draw	inferences	from	their	
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experience	and	this	impacts	on	behaviour.	In	short,	learning	is	the	cause	of	policy	change	
(May	1992;	Hall	1993).	The	textbook	example	applied	to	EU	integration	is	the	process	that	
led	to	Maastricht.	The	road	to	monetary	integration	took	more	than	twenty	years	to	be	
paved.	It	involved	instances	of	epistemic	learning,	decisive	political	entrepreneurship,	and	
ideational	convergence	over	time	towards	a	new	policy	paradigm	(McNamara	1998;	Verdun	
1999).		
This	inferential	learning	that	generates	change,	anyway,	is	challenged	by	the	findings	of	
experiments	in	behavioural/evolutionary	economics	and	psychology.	Here	we	consider	
‘contingencies’	in	two	ways,	using	human	contingency	learning	(HCL)	and	the	behavioural	
approach	to	contingent	learning.		
At	the	outset,	let	us	consider	two	distinct	dimensions	of	learning.	One	dimension	is	
cognitive.	Learning	is	about	an	individual	that,	faced	with	exogenous	changes,	considers	
whether	her	preferences	are	still	satisfied	when	the	environment	differs	from	the	past.	This	
individual	deliberates	whether	to	carry	on	with	current	behaviour,	or	choose	something	
else.	This	involves	cognition,	or,	bluntly,	something	that	goes	on	inside	the	mind.	The	other	
dimension	is	situational:	the	connection	between	events	and	consequences	(or,	to	put	in	
HCL	vocabulary,	cues	and	outcomes)	is	not	always	the	same.	It	depends	on	the	
characteristics	of	the	situation.	Hence	the	event	X	leads	to	Y	or	Z	depending	on	what	the	
situational	context	is.	HCL	and	the	behavioural	approach	to	contingent	learning	work	on	the	
two	dimensions	of	learning.	The	former	explores	causality	by	investigating	the	dimension	of	
cognition.	The	latter	looks	at	causality	from	the	perspective	of	the	situation.	They	are	
portrayed	in	figure	1.	
	
Figure	1	here	
	
Starting	with	cognition,	in	policy	learning	theories	(May	1992)	we	assume	that	an	individual,	
when	making	predictions	or	choosing	behaviour	on	the	basis	of	her	understanding	of	cause-
effect	relations,	reasons	inferentially	on	what	has	happened	(a	series	of	cue-outcome	
relations)	and	chooses	to	confirm	the	prediction/action	or	turn	to	another	type	of	behaviour	
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available	in	her	repertoire.	This	explicit	inference-based	process,	granted	bounded	
rationality,	takes	place	gradually	and	is	resource-intensive.	It	requires	the	conscious	
deployment	of	inferential	cognitive	capacities	and	reflexivity.	HCL	raises	the	question:	what	
is	the	role	of	surprise	on	predictions	and	actions?	Surprise	is	a	set	of	unexpected	cue-
outcome	relations	–	decision-makers	are	typically	confronting	these	relations	during	a	crisis.	
Through	the	analysis	of	blocking	effects2,	HCL	studies	show	that	the	likelihood	of	change	and	
learning	for	individuals	strongly	depends	upon	this	kind	of	new	(and	surprising)	causal	
associations,	but	in	a	much	less	resource-intensive	fashion	with	respect	to	that	envisaged	by	
standard	learning	theories.	In	particular,	associative	HCL	models	(Rescorla	and	Wagner	
1972;	Allan	1993;	Shanks	1995)	connect	lack	of	prior	experience	on	novel	causal	relations	(in	
terms	of	unexpected	and	confounded	cue-outcome	relations)	with	associative	learning.	For	
HCL	theorists,	it	is	exactly	the	lack	of	experience	about	the	relationship	existing	between	a	
given	stimulus	and	an	outcome	that	generates	what	we	would	call	surprise.	This	surprise	
about	the	causal	relationship,	in	turn,	triggers	learning	in	associative	form.	Note	that	
associative	HCL	‘…is	thought	to	be	fast	acting,	automatic,	and	would	require	little	cognitive	
resources	to	act’	(Morís	et	al.	2014:	77-78).	
This	phenomenon	fits	experimental	reality	much	better	than	a	predicate	whereby	prior	sets	
of	beliefs	and	paradigms	about	causation	inform	reasoned	inferential	behavioural	change.	
Strikingly,	this	kind	of	‘…learning	of	sound	patterns	can	occur	even	without	conscious	
attention’	(Bannard	and	Tommasello	2012,	emphasis	added).	Mutatis	mutandis,	this	
mechanism	of	behavioural	adaptation	seems	to	be	a	more	appropriate	depiction	of	the	
learning	processes	occurring	during	crises	rather	than	the	classic	take	on	cognition	in	policy	
learning	models.	We	can	elaborate	on	this	and	argue	that	the	findings	of	HCL	suggest	that	
resilient	beliefs	systems	may	not	be	a	major	hindrance	to	change	-	and	learning.	Surprise	
may	trump	priors	via	self-reinforcing	mechanisms	of	association	between	new	stimuli	and	
outcomes.		
																																								 																				
2	Put	simply,	blocking	in	HCL	experiments	refers	to	difficulty	in	learning	on	cue-outcome	relations	when	a	
specific	cue	is	paired	with	an	outcome	in	a	single	stage	and	then	in	a	successive	compound	stage	of	the	
experiment	the	same	cue	is	paired	with	another	one	producing	the	same	outcome	of	the	single	stage	(Morís	et	
al.	2014)					
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These	propositions	do	not	come	without	qualifications,	of	course.	Within	HCL,	some	have	
argued	that	contingency	judgements	and	the	actions	that	follow	are	not	entirely	driven	by	
self-reinforcing,	sometimes	unconscious	and	automatic,	associative	mechanisms.	For	some	
(Cheng	and	Novick	1990;	Cheng	and	Holyoak	1995),	it	is	iterated	statistical	evidence	and	
inference	that	reshapes	responses	to	new	cue-outcome	relations.	Thus,	the	discovery	of	
new	causal	links	between	behaviour	and	consequences	can	also	be	led	by	inference	rather	
than	surprise-driven	association	(Allan	1993;	De	Houwer	and	Beckers	2002).		
Nevertheless,	all	HCL	models	support	the	argument	that	effective	changes	in	the	responses	
to	different	stimuli	(i.e.	contingency	judgments	or	actions)	can	be	learned	and	refined	in	a	
relatively	short	amount	of	time	(i.e.	after	only	several	trials)	and	in	broadly	associative	
fashion.	Moreover,	the	experiments	indicate	that	when	changes	in	response	to	new	and	
unexpected	stimuli	(like	those	emerging	during	crises)	take	place,	the	key	drivers	of	change	
have	more	to	do	with	contextual	association	mechanisms	and	framing	effects	rather	than	
with	beliefs’	updating	and	conventional	inferential	reasoning	(conventional	for	us,	political	
scientists).	Associative	HCL	is	also	well	suited	to	account	for	common	biases	in	decision-
making.	Focusing	specifically	on	crisis-driven	decision	making	within	groups,	the	most	
commonly	theorized	biases	are	attentional	bias	(Rerup	2009)	and	groupthink	(Choi	and	Kim	
1999).	As	for	the	rationale	linking	associative	learning	to	attentional	biases,	‘a	loud	noise	is	
usually	expected	to	capture	more	attention	than	a	quiet	noise.	Associability	refers	to	the	
ease	or	speed	with	which	a	stimulus	can	be	learned	about.	It	is	further	assumed	that	all	else	
being	equal,	learning	will	be	faster	(associability	will	be	higher)	for	more	salient	stimuli.	
Thus,	the	relationship	between	a	loud	noise	and	shock	will	be	learned	faster	than	between	a	
quite	noise	and	shock’	(Mitchell	and	Le	Pelley	2010:	1).	Attentional	bias	can	be	smoothly	
integrated	within	groupthink	dynamics.	The	evaluation	of	the	salience	of	a	given	stimulus	is	
based	on	collective	confirmation	biases.	The	faster	(associative)	learning	triggered	by	salient	
stimuli	is	then	subject	to	bandwagon	effect	finally	resulting	in	beliefs’	convergence	and	
‘group	thought’	associative	responses	to	crises.			
Thus,	experimental	findings	demonstrate	that	the	degree	and	nature	of	change	is	greater	
the	bigger	the	surprise	and	salience	of	a	stimulus	are,	or	in	other	words,	the	more	
unexpected,	confounded	and	relevant	stimuli	are.	This,	applied	to	collective	decision	
making,	tells	us	that	a	shocking	crisis	can	allow	for	more	and	faster	change	than	a	smooth	
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process	whereby	knowledge	is	accumulated	and	processed	rationally/inferentially	and	
change	takes	place	upon	lengthy	reflection.	
Enter	the	behavioural	approach	to	contingent	learning	now.	This	allows	us	to	explore	the	
situational	dimension	of	learning.	Like	in	the	previous	case,	we	focus	on	the	identification	of	
causal	relations.	We	do	that	by	drawing	on	a	strand	of	experimental	findings	reviewed	
among	others	by	Tilman	Slembeck	(1998	and	1999).	This	economist	has	turned	to	
experiments	to	explore	how	situational	variables	affect	learning.	The	situational	
determinants	of	learning	are	both	structural	and	interactive.	Structural	determinants	refer	
to	the	complexity	of	the	environment	and/or	complexity	of	tasks,	the	degree	of	inter-
dependency	among	actors	(often	operationalized	as	number	of	players),	and	how	much	
information	is	available	about	the	environment,	the	resources	and	the	actors.	Interaction	
determinants	involve	uncertainty	about	the	strategies	and	quality,	quantity,	content	and	
timing	of	feedback.		
The	findings	of	this	approach	complement	(and	converge	with)	those	of	HCL.	In	situations	
characterized	by	high	structural	and	strategic	uncertainty,	fragmented	information	and	poor	
feedback,	even	relatively	small	modifications	of	the	context	can	nudge	decisions	effectively,	
triggering	contingent	learning	(Slembeck	1998	and	1999).	This	is	at	odds	with	conventional	
views	–	where	uncertainty,	poor	information	and	the	wrong	feedback	hinder	the	
mechanisms	of	learning.	But	it	is	not	at	odds	with	experimental	evidence.	
The	point	is	that	learning	in	theory	and	learning	in	experiments	diverge	quite	significantly.	
Theories	of	learning	in	social	sciences	are	ad	hoc:	when	they	are	tested	in	experimental	
settings	they	function	exclusively	under	narrow	ideal-typical	assumptions.	Experiments	(for	
instance	the	so	called	‘three-doors-anomaly’	-	Friedman	[1998]	-	and	the	‘endowment	
effect’	pioneered	by	Daniel	Kahneman	and	colleagues	[1991])	have	indeed	demonstrated	
that	even	marginally	relaxing	the	initial	conditions	of	a	given	real-world	situation	can	have	
dramatic	impacts	on	the	‘on-paper	rational’	expectations	of	learning	theories.	The	point	is	
that	learning	theories	only	work	under	narrow,	often	unrealistic	assumptions	that	rarely	
match	the	empirical	reality	of	decision	making.	These	assumptions	cannot	cover	all	the	
potential	contingent	circumstances	that	can	impact	on	learning	outcomes	in	actual	
situations,	even	more	so	in	the	case	of	critical	emergency-driven	policy-making.	Therefore	
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we	need	to	develop	a	framework	where	contingencies	–	and	their	relation	with	observable	
outcomes	–	are	properly	factored	in.		
Empirically,	the	contingent	mechanism	has	potential	to	explain	intra-crisis	learning	during	
the	Eurozone	crisis	whereby	we	observe	both	single-loop	learning	and	policy	change.		A	
similar	causal	mechanism	is	sketched	in	the	crisis	management	literature	but,	as	far	are	we	
are	aware,	it	has	not	been	explicitly	conceptualized	under	a	theoretical	construct	with	
sound	micro-foundations.	Thus	Birkland	(2009:154)	rightly	observes	that	in	intra-crisis	
management	actors	‘do	not	have	a	great	deal	of	time	to	be	reflective	and,	instead,	must	
often	improvise	to	find	good	interim	solutions	to	problems	that	were	unanticipated,	or	to	
problems	that	cannot	be	ameliorated	through	standard	operating	procedures’.	But	he	
portrays	this	phenomenon	as	‘improvisation’.	Contingent	learning	relates	instead	to	
behavioural	change	as	a	result	of	inescapable	systemic	pressures,	contingencies	and	
unexpected	stimuli	that	call	for	an	immediate	response.	This	happens	in	the	absence	of	
proper	cognitive	inferential	processing	of	the	new	information.		
Contingent	learning	is	not	learning	lessons	from	the	crisis	hence,	but	learning	(via	change)	
during	the	crisis.	Paradoxically,	the	resulting	behavioural	change	can	resemble	the	effects	of	
double-loop	learning,	but	the	emergence	of	new	policy	paradigms	and	cause-effect	beliefs	
under	contingent	learning	is	not	the	fruit	of	reflexive	lesson	drawing	(for	which	time	and	
knowledge	accumulation	are	critical).	Rather,	it	arises	out	of	associative	responses	to	
unprecedented	stimuli	whose	persistence	calls	for	immediate	action.	The	cognitive	process	
behind	change	is	therefore	contingent	and	associative	(as	opposed	to	reflexive	and	
inferential).	Importantly,	it	also	allows	for	cognitive	biases	to	be	factored	in	the	decisional	
process.	Contingent	learning	leads	to	outcomes	typical	of	double-loop	learning,	but	without	
reflexivity.		
These	phenomena,	although	largely	overlooked	in	the	literature	and	treated	as	
improvisation,	deserve	instead	an	explicit	conceptualization	because	they	are	typical	of	
crises:	‘Both	single-	and	double-loop	learning	presuppose	cognitive	reflection.	But	as	prior	
research	on	the	topic	shows,	and	as	this	study	reiterates,	such	critical	and	deeper	reflection	
is	not	a	conventional	response	to	crises.	Rather	than	engaging	in	reflective	cognition	and	
analytical	investigations	in	response	to	crises,	managers	tend	to	resort	to	mechanic	
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adaptation	and	reflex	reactions	in	response	to	failures	and	external	threats”	(Deverell	2009:	
185,	emphasis	added).	According	to	the	associative	mechanism,	in	intra-crisis	management	
sense-making	(cognition)	and	implementation	of	appropriate	responses	(behaviour)	are	
conflated	in	a	single	process.	
Our	discussion	leads	us	to	the	following	observable	implications.	Under	conditions	of	
extreme	surprise	and	uncertainty,	we	would	expect	the	contingent	learning	mechanism	to	
trump	priors	and	policy-makers	to	respond	in	fast-associative	ways.	Policy-makers	choose	
the	(right)	course	of	action	absent	inferential	policy	learning	–	they	do	not	need	to	
understand	the	major	cause-effect	relations	at	work	in	a	situation	to	react.	Sense-making	
and	behaviour	are	a	single	process,	as	we	just	said.	We	would	expect	these	responses	to	be	
patterned	by	the	cue-outcome	dyads	we	described	(see	also	below).	Then	we	would	expect	
inferential	learning	to	take	place	after	change,	provided	that	feedback	is	sufficiently	strong	
to	anchor	the	lessons	learned.	
	
4. From	experiments	to	politics	
We	established	that	the	decisional	process	leading	to	behavioural	change	can	take	place	
before	policy	learning	occurs.	In	our	approach,	inferential	learning	takes	place	ex-post,	as	a	
reflection	grounded	on	feedback.	Once	change	has	occurred,	feedback,	
inferential/probabilistic	reasoning,	and	reflexivity	step	in	and	determine	the	sort	of	
conventional	learning	theorized	in	political	science.	This	leads	us	to	the	(apparently	
paradoxical)	inversion	of	causality:	policy	learning	follows	change	instead	of	determining	it.	
The	approach	has	indeed	proved	to	be	in	line	with	the	experimental	results.	Of	course,	
experiments	operate	at	the	level	of	individuals	(and	sometimes	animals)	under	controlled	
conditions.	Real-world	politics	operates	at	the	level	of	complex	organizations	with	multiple	
actors	and,	in	the	EU,	different	levels	of	governance	–	not	in	labs.		
We	have	so	far	theorized	learning	and	made	a	plausibility	argument	for	an	alternative	
understanding	of	causality.	Can	we	also	present	a	plausibility	probe,	looking	at	evidence	that	
seems	in	line	with	our	theoretical	expectations?	Can	we	then	draw	on	our	findings	to	enter	
a	conversation	with	recent	scholarship	in	integration	theory	inspired	by	Neo-Functionalism	
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(NF:	Niemann	and	Ioannou	2015)	and	Liberal	Inter-governmentalism	(LI:	Schimmelfennig	
2015)?	
The	plausibility	probe	is	an	empirical	device	to	test	the	plausibility	of	a	novel	theoretical	
mechanism.	The	aim	is	to	prove	that	the	mechanism	is	at	least	feasible	-	yet	feasible	does	
not	mean	probable.	Plausibility	probes	are	common	in	exploratory	studies	(Eckstein	1992;	
Levi	2008)	when	dealing	with	new	theoretical	claims.	Such	exploratory	probe	is	a	first	step	in	
a	multi-stage	research	agenda.	Practically,	we	focus	on	the	observable	implications	of	the	
theorised	mechanism.	The	probe	is	not	a	fully-fledged	theory-testing	exercise	that	can	
discriminate	between	rival	alternative	mechanisms.	When	we	criticize	existing	theories	of	
integration,	the	aim	is	to	draw	on	our	theorised	mechanism	to	fill	in	the	gaps	in	NF	and	LI,	
knowing	that	different	causal	mechanism	may	well	have	been	at	work	during	different	
stages	of	this	long	crisis.	For	us,	the	crucial	episodes	referring	to	the	observable	implications	
of	our	theory	occurred	in	2010	–	and	feedback	anchored	the	contingent	learning	later	on.	
This	is	not,	therefore,	a	claim	that	contingent	learning	explains	the	whole	set	of	episodes	of	
the	crisis	or	played	out	in	all	the	crises	of	the	EU.	
Plausibility	probe	
The	dreadful	situation	of	Greek	public	finances	was	publicly	disclosed	in	early	December	
2009	when	new	Greek	Prime	Minister	George	Papandreou	announced	that	Greece’s	budget	
deficit	would	have	peaked	up	to	the	12.7%	of	the	GDP	–	more	than	twice	the	figure	
previously	announced.	The	cue	was	hence	represented	by	the	disclosure	of	the	actual	
deficit.	The	expected	outcome	of	this	cue,	under	normal	circumstances,	would	have	
involved	little	more	than	peers’	criticism	toward	the	interested	country	and	a	slight	
worsening	of	its	financing	conditions	on	the	private	markets.	3	The	EU	policy	reaction	to	this	
																																								 																				
3	To	use	an	accessible	example,	consider	Pavlov’s	experiment	with	dogs.	In	that,	a	cue	consists	in	a	conditioned	
stimulus	(e.g.	Pavlov	ringing	a	bell).	The	outcome	consists	instead	in	an	unconditioned	stimulus	(e.g.	Pavlov	
feeding	the	dogs	after	having	rang	a	bell).	After	several	iterations	of	this	cue/outcome	dyad,	dogs	learn	to	
associate	the	unconditioned	stimulus	(cue)	to	the	conditioned	stimulus	(outcome),	even	when	the	latter	is	not	
presented.	In	fact,	Pavlov	dogs	start	salivating	(reaction)	when	the	bell	is	rang	(cue),	that	is,	before	the	food	is	
actually	provided	(outcome).	The	learned	reaction	defaults	when	the	known	cue/outcome	relationship	is	
blocked	or	modified,	eliciting	hence	a	different	reaction	that	is	triggered	by	contingent	learning	rather	than	by	
conditioning.	In	the	Greek	case,	the	new	dyad	is	a	high	budget	deficit	(cue)	coupled	with	a	risk	of	sovereign	
default	-	a	totally	new	outcome	in	the	light	of	the	fact	that	in	the	first	decade	of	EMU	risk	premia	and	interest	
rates	were	strongly	unresponsive	to	Member	States’	budgetary	stance.	
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situation,	then,	would	have	followed	the	usual	procedure:	the	issuing	of	an	early	warning,	
the	enactment	of	an	excessive	deficit	procedure	and	an	adjustment	path	agreed	with	the	
Commission.	In	fact,	the	risk	of	a	Greek	default,	back	in	February,	March	and	April	2010	was	
looming,	but	not	totally	concrete.4	To	use	the	contingent	learning	vocabulary,	the	cue	took	
place	(that	is,	the	coming	out	of	the	Greek	government)	but	not	yet	its	unexpected	outcome	
(that	is,	the	concrete	risk	of	a	sovereign	default).	In	this	in-between	phase,	lacking	the	clear	
emergence	of	the	outcome,	the	contingent	reaction	could	not	be	triggered;	hence	Member	
States	and	EU	institutions	were	sticking	to	their	beliefs	and	preferences.	They	engaged	in	
what	we	call,	with	hindsight,	denial.5	
The	explosion	of	risk	premia	on	Greek	debt	issues	and	the	subsequent	risk	of	a	sovereign	
default	due	to	external	market	discipline	represented	by	all	means	an	unexpected	outcome	
that	interrupted	the	well-known	and	expected	cue/outcome	dyad	and	led	to	a	contingent	
response.6	This	latter	took	the	form	of	the	establishment	of	a	bailout	fund	(outside	the	
acquis	communitaire)	and	the	enactment	of	a	more	integrated	and	strict	regime	for	
economic	governance.	The	chosen	policy	solution	(the	reaction)	was	contingent	in	that	it	did	
not	belong	to	a	set	of	predefined	recipes	drawn	from	conventional	sense-making	and	long	
terms	preferences	and	beliefs.	To	renege	on	the	no	bail	out	clause	of	EMU	and	to	create	an	
external	vehicle	for	the	financial	rescue	of	Member	States	strongly	defied	functional	and	
																																								 																				
4	“At	the	beginning	of	2010,	Greece	had	little	difficulty	raising	new	debt.	On	25	January	it	went	to	market	
looking	to	raise	approximately	€3-5bn	and	came	home	with	€8bn,	because	it	faced	demand	for	its	bonds	worth	
roughly	€25bn.	The	same	thing	happened	in	early	March,	when	the	Greek	government	looked	for	€5bn	and	
found	bids	for	just	under	three	times	that	amount.	Finally,	it	happened	again	in	April,	shortly	after	the	
European	Union	held	out	the	promise	of	conditional	support.	Greece	came	to	the	market	looking	for	€1.2bn	in	
short-term	credits,	found	close	to	€8bn	in	offers,	and	went	home	with	€1.5bn	instead.	Nor	was	debt	servicing	
the	major	problem.	Although	the	Greek	government	complained	loudly	about	the	yields	necessary	to	attract	
attention	to	these	new	issues,	they	were	broadly	comparable	to	much	of	the	debt	it	was	retiring	and	so	would	
not	create	problems	until	well	into	the	future	as	the	stock	of	debt	to	be	serviced	continued	to	mount”	(Jones	
2010,	p.	28).	What	precipitated	the	crisis	was	not	new	financing	or	servicing,	but	the	flow	of	old	debt	into	new	
bonds.	Specifically,	markets	worried	that	the	Greek	government	would	have	trouble	refinancing.	Just	under	
€8.1bn	in	bonds	were	to	come	due	on	19	May	2010,	with	another	€400	million	maturing	fewer	than	two	weeks	
later.	Both	of	these	existing	tranches	of	debt	carried	very	high	coupons	(or	fixed	interest	payments)	of	6%”	
(Jones	2010,	pp.	28-29).	
5	‘Few	of	the	standard	criticisms	of	Europe’s	economic	and	monetary	union	expressed	serious	concern	for	this	
[default]	prospect.	Even	the	more	extreme	criticisms	did	not	make	it	the	focus	of	their	attention’	(Jones	2010:	
23).	
6	In	the	first	decade	of	EMU,	in	fact,	the	many	deviations	from	the	SGP	rules	were	never	punished	by	the	
markets.	In	other	words,	risk	premia	were	largely	unresponsive	to	deviations	from	the	SGP	ceilings	and	risks	of	
sovereign	defaults	within	the	Eurozone	never	arose.	
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incremental	solutions	as	well	as	the	long-term	preferences	of	core	EU	Member	States.	This	
accounts,	in	our	opinion,	as	a	contingent	reaction.	
Although	Greek	economic	fundamentals	appeared	immediately	extremely	weak,	it	took	a	
while	before	the	awareness	of	this	weakness	fully	translated	in	the	new,	unexpected	
outcome,	that	is,	the	objective	risk	of	a	Greek	sovereign	default.	Following	Jones	(2010:	28-
29),	this	took	place	only	as	late	as	in	April/May	2010	and	accounted	as	a	broadly	unexpected	
prospect.7	Only	then	the	unanticipated	cue/outcome	dyad	of	the	mechanism	of	contingent	
learning	was	complete	(where	the	cue	is	Papandreou’s	announcement	and	the	unforeseen	
outcome	is	the	risk	of	a	Greek	sovereign	default).	Whereas	in	HCL	experiments	
cue/outcome	dyads	are	presented	to	subjects	sequentially	triggering	their	immediate	
responses,	the	transposition	of	such	sequence	into	crisis-based	decision	making	allows	for	a	
slightly	longer	timeframe	(weeks	and	months	rather	than	seconds)	but	still	rapid	in	terms	of	
political	time.	
Thus,	drawing	on	the	vocabulary	of	the	mechanism	of	contingent	learning,	we	can	say:	
When	the	cue	(distressed	public	finances)	is	paired	with	its	unexpected	outcome	(the	
tangible	risk	of	sovereign	default),	we	find	behavioural	change,	that	is,	a	new	and	different	
reaction.	This	is	exactly	when	the	associative	processes	of	contingent	learning	applies,	
swiftly	leading	to	a	non-incremental	policy	change	(the	refusal	of	the	no	bail-out	clause).	
Note	that,	exactly	as	predicted	by	the	contingent	learning	mechanism,	this	change	occurs	
without	any	modification	of	beliefs.	Indeed,	Van	Esch	(2014	and	2015)	documents	
ambiguity,	a	relative	level	of	flexibility	(most	of	all	in	secondary	beliefs),	and	a	modest	
degree	of	convergence	in	EU	leaders’	views	during	the	crisis.	Yet	it	appears	clear	that	core	
beliefs	were	not	fundamentally	altered	(Van	Esch	2015).	This	is	the	proof,	for	us,	that	our	
mechanism	is	plausible.	
The	mechanism	explains	also	how	contingent	factors	leading	to	change	can	make	up	for	the	
lack	of	grand	visions.	Even	an	ordinary	leader,	with	short-term	electoral	horizon,	will	be	
forced	into	change	if	the	context	presents	extraordinary	pressure.	We	reason	that	when	the	
																																								 																				
7	‘Few	of	the	standard	criticisms	of	Europe’s	economic	and	monetary	union	expressed	serious	concern	for	this	
[default]	prospect.	Even	the	more	extreme	criticisms	did	not	make	it	the	focus	of	their	attention’	(Jones	2010:	
23).	
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very	existence	of	integration	and	domestic	state	structures	is	questioned	by	an	extremely	
challenging	context,	decision-makers	learn	in	associative	fashion	about	contingencies	and	
choose	non-incremental	change	that	enables	them	to	survive,	even	if	their	core	preferences	
would	suggest	them	to	go	for	more	limited	change.		
Contingent	learning	and	integration	theories	
Let	us	now	draw	on	the	findings	to	open	up	a	critical	conversation	with	integration	theories.	
Integration	theories	don’t	have	the	aim	of	explaining	crises.	Yet	they	offer	the	most	
important	conceptual	apparatus	to	make	sense	of	the	current	stage	of	integration,	
characterized	by	an	attempt	to	cope	with	a	political	and	economic	crisis.	
For	Niemann	and	Ioannou	the	Eurozone	crisis	is	in	part	an	endogenous	effect	of	the	
asymmetries	of	the	EMU	architecture.	The	integrative	steps	devised	to	cope	with	possible	
disintegration	were	somehow	functionally	written	in	EMU.	In	particular,	‘the	developments	
towards	deeper	economic	integration	can	be	explained	as	steps	taken	in	order	to	alleviate	
functional	pressures	arising	from	an	incomplete	architecture	created	at	Maastricht’	
(Niemann	and	Ioannou	2015:	201).	We	broadly	agree	with	this	general	explanation	of	the	
nature	of	the	integrative	reforms	of	EMU	spawned	by	the	crisis.	Yet	we	debate	it	on	the	
basis	of	two	arguments:	uncertainty	and	timing	of	the	decision	making.8		First,	this	NF	
understanding	of	crisis	management	overlooks	the	profound	uncertainty	about	causal	
relationships	and	consequences	of	different	courses	of	action	within	major	crises	triggered	
by	unexpected	events.	For	example,	no	functional	tension	arisen	from	EMU	architecture	
was	able	to	account	for	and	allowed	predicting	the	emergence	of	the	so-called	fiscal-
financial	nexus.	Indeed,	if	the	monetary-fiscal	asymmetry	of	EMU	was	predictable	from	a	
functional	perspective	(following	Niemann	and	Ioannou),	many	other	aspects	of	the	crisis	
led	the	EU	in	uncharted	territories	(Jones	2010).	Second,	with	regard	to	the	time	dimension:	
‘all	these	steps	deepened	to	a	remarkable	degree	European	economic	integration	within	a	
relatively	very	short	period	of	time’	(Niemann	and	Ioannou	2015:		200).	And	yet,	for	
																																								 																				
8	‘At	the	level	of	the	EU	it	was	difficult	initially	to	deal	with	the	immediate	crises	of	the	day,	as	individual	
member	states	were	uncertain	what	steps	had	to	be	taken	at	that	level,	given	the	speed	of	the	unfolding	crisis	
the	limited	budget	of	the	EU	and	the	lack	of	response	mechanisms	catering	to	this	kind	of	crisis’	(Verdun	2015:	
219).	‘In	terms	of	European	integration,	these	achievements	are	remarkable,	not	only	for	their	scale	and	scope	
but	also	the	speed	with	which	they	were	adopted	and	put	into	place’	(Ioannou	et	al.	2015:	164).	
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functional	pressures	to	translate	into	political	spillovers	it	is	necessary	that:	‘(national)	élites	
come	to	perceive	that	problems	of	substantial	interest	cannot	be	effectively	addressed	at	
the	domestic	level.	This	should	lead	to	a	gradual	learning	process	whereby	élites	shift	their	
expectations,	political	activities	and	[…]	even	loyalties	to	a	new	European	centre’	(ibid.	198,	
emphasis	added).	The	fast	speed	of	crisis	development	does	not	allow	us	to	make	the	case	
for	a	gradual	learning	process,	thus	muting	political	spillovers.9		
This	point	is	reinforced	also	by	the	observation	of	the	discursive	dimension.	True,	we	can	
show	that	the	functional	discourse	was	dominant	by	2012	(Niemann	and	Ioannou	2015:	
204).	But	it	is	much	harder	to	show	such	circumstance	in	2010,	that	is,	when	the	crisis	
started	to	spread	its	unexpected	cues	and	major	pro-integration	measures	were	swiftly	laid	
down	in	a	virtual	vacuum	–	both	in	the	discursive	and	strategic	dimensions	(the	key	events	
and	statements	of	2010	appear	in	Jones	2010;	Ioannou	et	al.	2015;	Schimmelfennig	2015;	
Tosun	et	al.	2014:	197-198).	Thus,	for	us,	the	scenario	of	2010,	when	key	reforms	were	
swiftly	agreed	on	under	objective	existential	threats	for	the	Eurozone,	was	one	of	decision-
making	wherein	political	actors	did	not	have	the	time	to	consciously	engrain	functional	
pressures	in	their	discourses	and	action.	Our	findings	concur	with	the	NF	logic	if	the	latter	
assumes	that	the	functional	tensions	are	not	known	to	the	actors.	These	are	the	classic	
spillovers	generated	by	institutions	and	the	responses	of	markets,	rather	than	being	
cultivated	or	acted	upon	by	strategic	actors.	
Intense	uncertainty	is	vividly	depicted	also	by	the	LI	account	of	the	crisis	(Schimmelfennig	
2015).		Nonetheless	the	process	of	preference	formation	amid	the	2010	storm	is	the	result	
of	hindsight	-	not	insight.	In	fact,	as	proved	by	Van	Esch	(2014)	through	comparative	
cognitive	mapping,	the	key	decision	maker	singled	out	by	the	LI	approach,	Chancellor	Angela	
Merkel,	held	no	specific	beliefs	about	benefits/disadvantages	of	deeper	integration	before	
the	unfolding	of	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	in	late	2009.10	The	events	of	spring	2010	–	as	
narrated	by	Schimmelfennig	(2015:	181-183)	-	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	hard	
bargaining	and	brinkmanship,	but	this	presupposes	steadfast	preference	formation.	Yet,	the	
																																								 																				
9	Moreover,	the	other	typology	of	supranational	spillovers	(the	“cultivated	ones”)	postulates	a	visible	
entrepreneurship	by	EU	institutions	that	was	not	observed	empirically.	
10	‘Prior	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Euro-crisis,	the	Chancellor	makes	few	references	to	European	integration	and	
hardly	mentions	European	economic	and	monetary	integration’	(Van	Esch	2014:	293-294).	
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timeframe	of	critical	events,	plagued	by	systemic	uncertainty	and	inconsistent	exogenous	
pressures	arising	from	the	markets,	did	not	allow	actors	to	factor	in	their	utility	functions	
the	dimensions	of	the	crisis.	LI	allows	for	bounded	rationality,	but	to	generate	explanatory	
leverage	it	must	assume	that	preferences	are	connected	to	clear,	ranked	payoffs	of	
alternative	courses	of	action.	
We	do	not	contend	that	by	2012	(i.e.	when	major	reforms	were	already	been	shaped	and	
agreed	upon)	the	mixed	motives	and	distributive	dimension	underlying	the	reforms	were	
identifiable,	but	we	cast	serious	doubts	that	in	2010	this	could	be	possible	in	the	clear-cut	
terms	postulated	by	LI.	Again,	the	fast	nature	of	crisis	development,	the	uncertainty	about	
unexpected	causal	relationships	and	the	exogenous	market	pressures	calling	for	immediate	
measures	limit	both	NF	reasoning	on	long-term	functional	pressures	and	LI	claims	on	
preference	formation.		
In	particular,	if	it	is	true	that	exit	costs	were	broadly	felt	like	untenable	by	all	the	players	
(Schimmelfennig	2015:	181-182	and	186-188),	it	is	hindsight	that	informs	us	about	the	
distributive	nature	of	the	integrative	steps	decided,	not	contextual	and	contingent	insight	
present	in	2010.	True,	dramatic	changes	of	positions	of	the	German	government	in	spring	
2010	about	the	Greek	bailout	can	indeed	belong	to	the	logic	of	a	chicken	game	and	to	the	
resort	to	brinkmanship.	Nonetheless,	they	can	also	be	fruit	of	acute	uncertainty	about	the	
outcomes	of	different	courses	of	actions	and	adaptive,	associative	(in	HCL	terms)	responses	
to	the	huge	exogenous	and	unprecedented	pressures	of	the	markets.	Schimmelfennig	
(2015:	182)	himself	acknowledges	in	part	this	by	stating	that	‘in	a	situation	rife	with	
uncertainty,	Merkel	ultimately	decided	against	taking	the	risk	of	Grexit.	This	debate	shows	
that	the	preferences	of	Germany,	a	core	actor,	on	Grexit,	a	core	policy	issue,	were	not	
unitary,	fixed	or	internalized.	
Our	approach	offers	a	more	fine	grained	understanding	of	the	mechanism	that	led	first	to	
the	emergency	measures	of	2010	(driven	by	contingency	more	than	by	functional	pressures	
or	rational	calculations)	and	then	only	afterwards	to	the	sense-making	process	that	followed	
them	in	2011	and	2012	that	reached	its	peak	with	the	‘Four	Presidents	Report’	(van	
Rompuy,	2012).	The	latter	belongs	to	the	ex-post	feedback	and	reflexivity	part	of	the	
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mechanism	of	contingent	learning.	Feedback	reinforced	the	choices	taken	under	pressure	of	
the	crisis	in	the	associative,	low-cognition	fashion	postulated	by	contingent	learning.		
Functional	pressures	arising	out	of	the	EMU	architecture	(NF)	and	national	preferences	and	
intergovernmental	bargaining	dynamics	(LI)	played	an	important	role.	Yet,	context	and	
contingency	are	not	weighted	enough	under	these	explanatory	mechanisms.	The	initial,	
external	trigger	of	the	crisis	generated	policy	puzzles	which	were	not	fully	covered	by	the	
functional	understanding	of	EMU	deficiencies	and	that	did	not	allow,	in	the	short-run,	the	
neat	formation	of	national	preferences.	Multiple	market	pressures	on	EMU	(impinging	on	
private	banks,	sovereign	debts,	single	member	states’	political	and	economic	systems	and	
supranational	institutions)	provided	new	unexpected	cause-effect	relations	for	the	decision	
makers.	Our	key	argument	is	that	contingent	learning	stepped	in	exactly	in	this	phase.	At	
the	critical	juncture	of	the	crisis	(from	December	2009	until	late	April/May	2010,	when	the	
Greek	bail-out	was	approved	and	successive	versions	of	financial	stability	facilities	were	
established),	the	context	of	urgency	and	‘need	to	save	the	Euro’	changed	their	causal	beliefs	
and	led	to	a	series	of	integrative	reforms	driven	by	associative	mechanisms.	This	
(contingent)	learning	process	occurred	without	canonical	inferential	thinking	and	without	a	
deep	understanding	of	the	paradigm	shift	it	implied.	Thus,	the	Euro	was	saved	by	a	process	
of	contingent	learning	fuelled	by	contextual	features	of	the	decision	making	–	a	process	
that,	in	a	way,	happened	accidentally.	Only	after	these	hallmark	decisions	were	taken,	
reflexive	learning,	sense-making,	and	neat	preference	formation	took	place,	not	before.		
Epistemic	communities	and	visionary	leaders	are	not	a	necessary	condition	for	change	in	
this	a	contingent	learning	world.	We	do	not	need	politicians	to	anchor	their	beliefs	to	the	
enlightenment	produced	by	epistemic	actors.	Simply,	in	contingent	learning	models	
politicians	do	not	have	to	draw	inferences	from	evidence	and	‘understand’	the	best	course	
of	action	out	of	the	crisis	before	they	select	the	right	course	of	action.	Thus,	this	condition	is	
no	longer	necessary	–	it	is	not	necessary	because	in	contingent	learning	causality	is	different	
from	the	cause-and-effect	relations	of	classic	political	science	learning.	
The	variable	of	surprise	(unexpected	cue-outcome	relations)	typical	of	HCL	models	is	
pertinent	here.	In	emergency,	most	of	all	in	intra-crisis	management,	decision-making	is	
faster.	The	conventional,	inferential	conditions	for	learning	via	
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preferences,	and	deliberation	are	absent	or	suspended.	Accidental,	unwilling	heroes	change	
behaviour	in	a	short	time-frame,	under	conditions	of	structural	uncertainty	(recall	
Slembeck’s	conditions).	Change-or-die	choice	architectures	nudge	our	accidental	federalists.	
Bankers	like	Draghi	go	on	stage	and	make	extraordinary	commitments	to	do	‘whatever	it	
takes’	to	save	the	Euro.	Merkel	may	defy	conventional	political	science	wisdom	about	
elections	and	short-term	horizon:	she	may	outrage	her	political	opponents,	foreign	
ministers	and	her	own	coalition	partners.	This	is	what	she	did	by	reneging	on	the	no	bail-out	
clause	of	EMU	and	agreeing	on	a	EU-based	rescue	package	for	Greece	in	April	2010.	That	
was	the	genesis	of	the	changes	in	the	EU	policy	on	acute	financial	instability.	After	the	first	
Greek	bail-out,	the	European	Commission	was	given	extraordinary	power	to	scrutinise	the	
national	budgets	of	the	Member	States,	even	to	impose	fines	and	(automatic)	sanctions.	
The	Stability	Fund	established	slightly	later	on	is	federal	in	nature,	since	it	overtly	overcomes	
the	no-bail	out	principle.	Under	the	pressure	of	the	markets	and	in	a	classic	trial-and-error	
dynamics,	the	instruments	within	the	toolkit	of	the	ECB	have	been	enlarged	allowing	for	a	
relaxation	of	the	commitment	to	stable	inflation	in	favour	of	a	sort	of	discretion	conceded	
to	the	central	bankers	(Buti	and	Carnot	2012).		
There	is	also	a	role	for	Slembeck’s	condition	about	feedback	mechanisms	that	lock-in	the	
effects	of	learning.	Feedback	re-organizes	the	beliefs	of	policy-makers,	making	them	learn	
how	to	operate	within	the	new	circumstances	that	become	the	new	taken-for-granted	
context.	This	finding	opens	a	conversation	with	historical	institutionalism.	Further	research	
should	explore	how	our	behavioural,	contingent	mechanisms	relate	to	the	macro-historical	
mechanisms	and	types	of	changes	described	by	Mahoney	and	Thelen	(2010).		
To	conclude:	we	have	proved	that	our	theorized	causal	sequence	passes	a	plausibility	probe	
and	is	conversant	with	integration	theories,	not	that	the	EU	is	learning	how	to	avoid	the	
next	crisis.	Learning	can	still	be	dysfunctional	in	an	inter-crisis	context:	the	current	
responses	to	the	Eurozone	crisis	may	lead	to	the	next	crisis,	as	suggested	by	the	‘failing	
forward	mechanism’	of	Jones	et	al.	(2015).		
	
5. Conclusions	
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We	have	explored	the	cause-and-effect	relationship	between	learning	and	change	in	novel	
ways,	drawing	lessons	from	psychology	and	strands	of	behavioural	and	evolutionary	
economics	to	formulate	new	arguments	about	how	cognitive	and	situational	variables	affect	
change.	Our	mechanism	explains	short-term,	fast-brushed	decision	making	involving	and	
leading	to	abrupt	change.	This	mechanism	exerts	its	influence	over	the	longer	term	via	
feedback	and	reinforcement	of	contingent	decision	making.	Our	analysis	contributes	to	
theories	of	learning,	social	mechanisms,	and	crisis	management	in	public	policy,	by	
providing	a	new	angle	and	lenses	to	theorize	cause-and-effect	mechanisms.	These	lenses	
may	look	abstract,	but	they	have	been	developed	on	the	accurate	observation	of	how	
individuals	behave	under	experimental	conditions.	Thus,	they	start	from	how	people	behave	
in	the	real	world,	not	how	people	behave	in	game-theoretical	models.	This	is	an	element	of	
strength	when	we	suggest	–	as	we	do	–	to	draw	implications	from	these	models	for	public	
policy	analysis	and	theories	of	European	integration.		
It	would	be	wrong	to	use	the	lessons	of	our	exercise	to	make	strong	predictions.	We	argue	
that	our	mechanism	was	present	in	this	crisis,	but	other	crises	of	the	EU,	past	and	present	
(think	of	the	refugees	crisis)	may	have	very	different	underlying	learning	mechanisms.	
However,	we	have	carried	out	a	plausibility	probe	to	show	how	the	learning	mechanisms	
that	exist	in	the	models	may	support	observations	of	real-world	EU	learning.	We	have	
examined	the	effect	of	surprise,	feedback,	and	uncertainty	in	the	current	responses	to	the	
crisis.	Integration	theorists	working	on	mechanisms	(like	Jones	et	al.	2015)	may	benefit	from	
our	analysis	by	incorporating	our	causal	sequence	of	crisis-contingent	learning-change-	
feedback	and	conventional	policy	learning	into	their	wider	explanatory	accounts	of	
integration.	We	have	not	challenged	integration	theories,	but	used	our	claims	about	
learning	to	fill	in	the	gaps	in	existing	theories	of	integration.	There	are	indeed	opportunities	
to	exploit	by	incorporating	the	study	of	human	cognition	into	integration	theories.	Overall,	
our	findings	suggest	that	contingent	learning	passes	the	plausibility	probe.	But	our	
exploration	of	learning	is	not	about	what	the	EU,	or	the	federalists,	or	anyone	else	should	
do.	It	is	above	all	a	call	for	a	new	research	agenda	in	the	field	of	policy	learning,	to	make	this	
field	more	receptive	to	and	interested	in	micro-foundations	drawn	from	the	study	of	human	
cognition.		
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